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Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate franchisees’ perception of the 
value of quality service in the franchise system.  
Methodology – Two dimensions, perceived importance and perceived gaps of the 
quality of the franchise system, form the anchors of a proposed 2 X 2 Franchise System 
Quality (FSQ) Matrix. This is empirically tested with 200 Australian franchisees.  
Findings – The results reflected a strong evidence of four distinct profiles of 
franchisees as conceptualized. These results also showed that the more cooperative the 
franchisees, the better their performance and satisfaction levels with the system. In 
contrast to existing literature, franchisees who fall in the high-perceived importance 
cells of the FSQ matrix have a stronger desire for autonomy. 
Managerial implications – Cooperation between franchisees and franchisors are 
fundamental to achieve success. It is important to provide resources and assistance to 
franchisees and these are considered as key success factors. Further, determining the 
profile of the franchisees allows franchisors to determine the potential Best Buddy who 
are considered an asset in the franchise system.  
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Limitations – A larger sample size should be implored that focuses on specific 
industries or service sectors. The research can be replicated in other non-Western 
contexts to formulate different insights. Cross national studies could be conducted to 
investigate differences between cultures.  
Originality/value – The paper addresses the gap in literature by examining 
franchisees’ perception of the value of services provided in a franchise system. The 
FSQ Matrix is also conceptualized and empirically tested on an Australian sample.  
Paper type – Research paper 
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INTRODUCTION 
Franchising is one of the fastest growing business sectors in international business 
(Duckett, 2008; Chiou, Hsieh and Yang, 2004; Guilloux et al., 2004; Maritz and 
Nieman, 2008). In Australia, franchising contributes 14% of the national GDP and 
comprises of enterprising entrepreneurs as franchisors, and franchisees employing at 
least 600,000 Australians (Franchise Council of Australia, 2008). These range from 
food retailers, other service oriented establishments, education providers, and petrol 
and automobiles chains. It is perceived as an attractive strategy to set up a business 
quickly with a proven brand, working system and successful product. It allows one to 
enjoy the benefits of a well developed marketing and support structure. In principle, a 
franchisor sets the performance standards, builds brand name and manages the 
economic efficiencies (Harmon and Griffiths, 2008). A franchisee expects a working 
model, ongoing training, support and solutions to problems from the franchisor (Combs 
et al., 2004).  As franchisees are also tenants of identity, they are expected to adhere 
strictly to policies, standards, rules and regulation (Davis, 2004). In theory at least, 
franchisees are closely tied to the franchiser, and their independence and autonomy are 
limited to the confines of their franchise agreement. Any deviation will lead to an 
imbalance and thus opening up a gap for dissatisfaction. But there are some inherent 
concerns with the franchising partnerships. These may include conflicts over 
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managerial control and differing degrees of risk-aversions (Greco, 2001). The 
consequence of these perceived differences may be a fall in efficiency of the system 
performance (Maritz and Nieman, 2008). It is the major responsibility of the franchisor 
to evaluate and understand the real needs of the franchisees (e.g. Harmon and Griffiths, 
2008). In addition, there is a necessity to resolve the differences between the respective 
perceptions of the franchise relationship. Empirical research has indicated that the 
perception of a franchisee will affect his actions, choices and franchise performance 
(Falbe et al., 1998; Forward and Fulop, 1993; Kaufmann and Stanworth, 1995; 
Morrison, 1997; Spinelli and Birley, 1996; 1998). This can prevent conflicts thereby 
enhancing the cooperation. It will then facilitate a conducive network between the 
franchisors and franchisees (Falbe and Dandridge, 1992).  
 
Three important contributions to the literature will emerge from this study. First, most 
researchers have pointed to the important role of franchisees in the success of the 
relationship (such as, Jambulingam and Nevin, 1999; Maritz and Nieman, 2008). 
Specifically, recognizing franchisee’s perception of the value of services will allow 
franchisors to effectively manage the partnership (e.g. Harmon and Griffiths, 2008; 
Peterson and Dant, 1990).  Unfortunately, this is very scant in the literature (e.g. 
Grunhagen and Dorsch, 2003; Harmon and Griffiths, 2008). This paper takes the 
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precedence in filling this gap. Second, the relationship between perceived importance 
and perceived gaps of the quality of the franchise system and its effects has not been 
adequately looked at (Maritz and Nieman, 2008). This paper will study these effects 
from the viewpoint of the franchisees. Third, using these two dimensions, a matrix is 
conceptualized and empirically tested with a sample of Australian franchisees. The 
finding will provide franchisors with a typology of 4 profiles by which the 
characteristics of each are identified and discussed. This will provide some directions to 
better understand and manage the franchisees and the overall system. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The literature will be presented, leading to the 
proposed matrix. Hypotheses devised to empirically test the matrix will be discussed in 
detail. The research design, analysis and findings are presented. Finally, implications, 




The franchisor-franchisee relationship is bounded by a legal contract definitively 
outlining the obligations and rights of both parties (Brickley et al., 1991; Grunhagen 
and Dorsch, 2003; Castrogiovanni and Justis, 1998). Generally, the franchisor provides 
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the trademark, the business model, legal advice, consultation and training of the 
business as well as advertising leadership.  In return, the franchisee pays a fee and is 
also expected to follow a set of policies and regulations structured to protect the 
interests of both parties (Harmon and Griffiths, 2008). The franchise system links the 
advantages of economy of scale offered by the franchisor with the local knowledge and 
entrepreneurial talents of the franchisee (Stanworth, 1988). This relationship represents 
a partnership in such a way whereby both parties will share benefits and costs (Macneil 
1980; Grunhagen and Dorsch, 2003), thereby contributing significantly to the 
profitability and success of franchisees (Porter and Renforth, 1978; Kaufmann and 
Lafontaine, 1994; Michael, 1999).  
 
Conflicts 
In reality, conflicts in such relationships are commonplace, and are well documented in 
the literature (Bongiorno, 1993; Pollack, 1996; Porter and Renforth, 1978; Smith, 1993; 
Shivell and Banning, 1996). Differences emerging from goal priorities, time 
perspectives and earning expectations have on the one hand led franchisors engaging in 
unfair termination of franchisees; and on the other hand, led franchisees to act on 
potential market opportunities in pursuit of their own entrepreneurial interests 
(Gassenheimer et al., 1996). This is not uncommon especially in the Australian context 
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where the law seems to favour the franchisees. The Franchising Code of Conduct gives 
the legal rights to the franchisee by limiting the franchisor’s control over the activities 
of the business (Davis, 2004). 
 
Agency Theory 
The franchise relationship is characterized by explicitly defined obligations and a “give 
and take” reciprocity consistent with the literature on agency theory (Grunhagen and 
Dorsch,  2003: Price and Arnould, 1999; Rubin, 1978). This refers to the contractual 
arrangement between the agent and the principal to help maintain order in a variety of 
procedural issues as stated in the agreement (Eisenhardt, 1989; Elango and Fried, 1997; 
Sharma, 1997; Bergen et al., 1992; Hesterly et al., 1990). Applying this to the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship, the franchisor will take away the burden and costs of 
selecting and training staff members (Stanworth, 1996). At the same time the franchisee 
is assumed to exercise more motivation and commitment as the personal investment is 
at stake. Thus, administrative efficiency is achieved from the franchisor’s perspective 
by simply aligning their incentives with that of their franchisees (Carney and 
Gedajlovic, 1991; Dant and Nasr, 1998). There is however one nagging concern.  
Franchisors consistently have to deal with franchisees with varying degrees of risk 
tolerance. Consequently, goal conflicts between these parties, combined with uncertain 
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conditions and incomplete information may contribute to agency problems. One good 
example is when franchisees not conforming to the contract directives (Shane, 1996; 
Bergen et al., 1992; Brickley et al., 1991). To alleviate this, monitoring costs can be 
invested by the franchisor to evaluate the franchisees’ activities and to identify any 
opportunistic behavior (Bergen et al., 1992).   
 
Zone of Performance Tolerance 
Within the franchising setting, there is an inherent behavioral zone of performance 
tolerance, which is a function of the importance of the franchisor-provided services, 
and the adequate provision of any of the franchisor- provided services. As such, if the 
franchisee perceives the adequacy of the service from the franchisor as being equal to or 
better than the level of perceived importance within the zone of performance tolerance, 
the franchisor is deemed to have fulfilled the contractual obligations. On the other hand, 
if the adequacy of service delivery is perceived to be below the perceived importance of 
the service, then the behavior of franchisees may fall outside the tolerance zone 
(Spinelli and Birley, 1996; 1998; Gassenheimer et al., 1996; Pizanti and Lerner, 2003).  
 
Gaps in the Literature 
Research measuring the franchisees’ perspective of both importance and adequacy of 
the franchisor-provided services is inherently deficient. In addition, Spinelli and 
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Birley’s (1996; 1998) found that the perceived level of fulfillment against 
franchisor-provided services is contingent not only on the ranked importance of a 
service from the franchisor, but also the gap between the adequacy and importance for 
which that service is delivered. In essence, the quality value of the franchise system is a 
critical success factor (Falbe and Welsh, 1998). This may include consistent and 
continuous training and support, maintenance of high quality standards, and 
achievement of maximum efficiency in the operating system. As such it can be assumed 
that the higher the franchisors’ perceived importance of system quality, the higher the 
level of satisfaction of the franchisee (Pizanti and Lerner, 2003; Grunhagen and 
Mittelstaedt, 2000). In addition, the perceived gap and perceived importance of the 
system must also be considered.  
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Using the two dimensions of perceived gap and perceived importance as described in 
the preceding literature, a franchise system quality (FSQ) matrix is proposed. The four 
cells are presented in Figure 1. Cell 1 is characterized by a high perceived importance 
and high perceived gap permutation and is labeled as Black Sheep franchisees. They 
fall outside the performance tolerance level and are likely to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour. Cell 2 is characterized as a low perceived importance and high perceived 
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gap permutation and is described as the Whinger franchisees. They complain about 
management all the time and are of high maintanance.  However, they are well within 
the performance tolerance level.  They may also act opportunistically if the chance 
arises. Cell 3 is characterized as a low perceived importance and low perceived gap 
permutation and is labeled as Rough Diamond franchisees.  They do not have much 
commitment to the system and are very likely to be opportunists. Cell 4 is characterized 
by a high perceived importance and low perceived gap permutation and is labeled as the 
Best Buddy franchisees. They are highly cooperative and fall well within the 
performance tolerance level.  They are considered the model franchisees that are an 
asset to the franchise system.  
 
~~~~ Insert Figure 1 ~~~~ 
 
The four cells of the proposed matrix possess distinctly different characteristics when 
measured against the two dimensions.  It is thus anticipated that: 
H1: The cooperation of the franchisees can be aligned on a low to high continuum in the 
order of Black Sheep, Rough Diamond, Whinger, and Best Buddy franchisees. 
 
Researchers (such as Jambulingam and Nevin, 1999; Whittemore, 1994) have found 
that a supportive work environment and a cooperative franchisor-franchisee 
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relationship had a significantly positive influence on the job satisfaction of the 
franchisee. That is, low perceived gaps and high perceived importance in the quality 
system will be most successful. The literature has also indicated that franchisees will 
remain in the partnership as long as they see that there is adequate support and 
contributions emerging from the franchisors (Garbarino and Johnson, 1999; Morrison, 
1997). Building on these bases and integrating them with the proposed FSQ Matrix, the 
following hypothesis is therefore formulated: 
H2: The satisfaction of franchisees and the intention to remain can be aligned on a low 
to high continuum in the order of Black Sheep, Rough Diamond, Whinger, and Best 
Buddy franchisees. 
 
Falbe and Welsh (1998) have identified some key factors for a successful franchise 
system.  For instance, franchisees expect the franchisor to invest in brand building and 
strengthening strategies such as national advertising and other forms of promotion. 
Second it is important that the franchisor is also to look for potentially profitable 
business locations and to exercise flexibility to adapt to local conditions. Chiou et al. 
(2004) also echoed Falbe and Welsh (1998) to stress the importance of communication 
in order to reinforce trust and overall satisfaction with the system. Finally, it is also 
expected that the franchisor shows leadership and involves the community by engaging 
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in innovative franchisee activities. Based on the previous inferences of Falbe and 
Welsh (1998), we assumed that a higher level of cooperative franchisees should require 
less monitoring and less resources, and also higher perceptions of success. Thus: 
H3: The perception of franchisees on (a) brand image, (b) local environment, (c) 
communications and (d) franchisee activities can be aligned on weak to strong 
continuum in the order of Black Sheep, Rough Diamond, Whinger, and Best Buddy 
franchisees. 
 
Investigations in the literature have highlighted that a substantial number of franchisees 
have histories of self employment experience and thus more likely to expect and enjoy 
autonomy in the operations of their outlets (Dant and Gundlach, 1998). The challenge 
for the management is to accommodate these differences (Stanworth, 1995). However, 
the desire for independence, autonomy and self-fulfillment will still be a rational goal 
for franchisees to join franchising systems (Dant and Nasr, 1998). In addition, as the 
franchisees emphasized more perceived importance to quality of the franchise system, 
it increases their desire for more autonomy. Previous research also indicates that once a 
franchisor encourages the franchisees to seek greater autonomy in decision making, it 
may enhance their entrepreneurial spirit and organizational commitment to the 
franchisor.  It will thus improve franchisor-franchisee relations and system 
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performance. This is because franchisees are encouraged to engage in more 
promotional and innovative activities, activate local market adaptation, and support the 
need for collective organization (Gassenheimer et al., 1996; Knight, 1984; Strutton et 
al., 1995; Withane, 1991). Thus: 
H4: Franchisees with higher desire for autonomy are likely to be Best Buddy 





A mailing list was developed based on the categories of franchisees identified from the 
Franchise Council of Australia website. A survey form was designed and pilot tested 
with a number of interviews with experts, franchisors and franchisees.  The final self- 
administered survey form was sent out to 1097 franchisees in intervals of two weeks. A 
reminder was sent out ten days after the first mailing. 97 were undelivered due to a 
number of technical issues. The final response rate was 20% or 200 franchisees. Of the  
completed and usable responses, 44.5% came from the automotive services sector, 10% 
from education services, 12.5% from the restaurant services sector, 7.5 % from leisure 
and lifestyle services, and finally 25.5% from others miscellaneous services.  
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Measures 
The scales used to operationalize the constructs in this research were adapted from 
previous research. All the scales recorded an alpha coefficient of above 0.70. Appendix 
I presents the measurement items employed and the scale reliabilities in this research. 
The perceived importance of FSQ was measured by a 9-item scale developed by Falbe 
and Welsh (1998). Respondents were asked to rate the perceived importance of the 
franchise system quality on a ten-point Likert type scale. The Perceived Gap of FSQ 
was measured with the same scale. The franchisee respondents were however asked to 
rate the perceived adequacy for each item of service quality. A ten-point Likert type 
scale was also applied here, with anchors ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly 
agree (10). The perceived gap was computed by subtracting the value of “importance” 
from “service quality adequacy” and then adding 9.0 to the difference. For instance, if 
the adequacy of franchisor’s ability to develop new products is 6.0 and that of 
importance is 10.0, the perceived gap is -4.0+9.0 = 5.0. If the value of perceived gap is 
larger, it means the gap between service quality adequacy and importance under 
franchisees perception is lower. In the same vein, if the value is smaller, it means that 
the gap is higher. 
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Franchisees’ “satisfaction and intention to remain” were measured by scales adapted 
from those of Gassenheimer et al. (1996) and Jambulingam and Nevin (1999). The data 
for “franchisee perceptions of success” were collected using scales adapted from Falbe 
and Welsh (1998). The Franchisee Autonomy was measured by a three-item scale 
adapted from Dant and Gundlach (1998).  Finally demographic and socioeconomic 
variables of the franchisee and franchisor were also requested. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation for the variables used 
in this study. Generally, there is no evidence of multi-collinearity in the data. The only 
variables that are highly correlated are applied to dependent variables in the MANOVA 
analyses.  
~~~~ Insert Table 1 ~~~~ 
 
FSQ Matrix 
The main statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3. These are used to test H1. The 
internal validity of the four-cell matrix was strongly supported by multivariate (i.e., 
MANOVA) analysis as well as by the subsequent univariate ANOVA tests (see Table 
2). Dant and Gundlach (1998) argued that although various criteria and guidelines are 
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offered for specifying the appropriate number of clusters, unfortunately “no standard 
objective selection procedure exists” (Hair et al., 1995, p.442). Thus, it can be 
established that the final cluster solution comprised of four clusters as theoretically 
introduced. The multivariate classification yielded a magnitude of effect of η
2
 = 0.71. 
Univariate effects (i.e., effect size, η
2
, see Cohen, 1977, p.282) showed that the 
four-cluster solution explained 87% and 90% of the variance in perceived importance 
and perceived gap measures respectively. In addition, the observed power in the 
magnitude was 0.96 (a value higher than 0.80). This is generally accepted to have 
demonstrated statistical conclusive validity (Cohen, 1977). 
 
~~~~ Insert Table 2 ~~~~ 
 
Evidence of the external validity of the clusters can be inferred from the results 
summarized in Table 3. The cooperation variable was added to test whether the 
four-cell solution is significantly different. The results revealed significant differences 
(p < 0.05) across the variant cooperation levels. As expected, franchisees with high 
perceived importance and low perceived gap of system quality (Cell 4) cooperate 
closely with the franchisors. On the other hand, the franchisees of Cell 1 (high 
perceived importance and high perceived gap) have the worst cooperative relationship 
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with the franchisors. The cooperation levels of franchisees of both Cells 2 and 3 are 
between Cells 1 and 2 (R
2
= .20). In brief, the proposed four-cell matrix received strong 
inferential support with regards to theoretical stability and validity. The tested results 
clearly support H1.  
~~~~ Insert Table 3 ~~~~ 
The MANOVA results presented in Table 3 were used to test the rest of the hypotheses. 
The decision rules are to verify that the mean of Cell 4 for each measure is higher than 
the other three cells, and mean of Cell 1 is the lowest among all for each measure.  
 
The results of franchisee satisfaction were as expected: Cell 4 reported the highest level 
of satisfaction (mean = 15.34). The least-squares means’ comparison shows that this 
mean was significantly different from that of the other three cells. The satisfaction of 
franchisees of Cell 2 (mean = 12.53) was higher than that for franchisees of Cell 1 
(mean = 9.84). This result demonstrates that franchisees who cooperate closely with 
their franchisor are likely to have higher satisfaction. In contrast, those who do not 
cooperate closely with their franchisor are likely to have less satisfaction. The links 
between intention to remain and system quality permutations were similar. The 
intention to remain for the franchisees of Cell 4 (mean = 10.70) was significantly higher 
than that of the other three cells. The intention to remain for those in Cell 2 (mean = 
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9.53) was significantly higher than those in Cell 1 (mean = 7.65). Although the mean of 
intention to remain of Cell 1 was not significantly lower than that of Cell 3 (mean = 
8.00), it was still the lowest of all cells. As such, the overall result is in support of H2. 
 
The results of brand image, local environment and communication are as predicted. 
Franchisees of Cell 4 reported the highest mean scores for brand image (mean = 30.74), 
local environment (mean = 14.98), and communication (mean = 24.01). The 
least-squares means’ comparison shows that these means were statistically different 
from those of the other three cells. Even though the least-squares means’ comparison 
was not statistically supported, the means of brand image (mean = 31.33), local 
environment (mean = 6.19), and communication (mean = 15.65) in Cell 1 were still the 
lowest among those of the other three cells. One deviation of what was proposed is with 
the factor of franchisee activities. The mean of Cell 4 (mean = 42.33) was significantly 
higher than those of Cell 2 (mean = 38.94), and Cell 1 (mean = 39.85), and Cell 3 (mean 
= 34.08). However, Cell 1 did not record the lowest mean of all the cells. As such, H1a, 
H1b and H1c are supported, while H1d is rejected.  
 
The MANOVA analysis for franchisee’s desire for autonomy was statistically 
significant (Table 3). Cells 1 and 4 (high perceived importance cells) reported the 
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highest means in their rating (mean = 14.35 and mean = 13.42, respectively) on overall 
franchisee desire for autonomy measures. Cell 2 and Cell 3 (low perceived importance 
cells) showed comparatively lower means rating (mean = 13.97 and mean = 15.46, 
respectively). The empirical evidence conforms to the expected results. Those with 
high levels of perceived importance were the franchisees with the highest desire for 
autonomy. Thus, H4 is fully supported.  
 
DISCUSSION 
With empirical evidence, the initial four cell matrix can be redefined. Black Sheep 
Franchisees in Cell 1 are presented by a sample of 40 franchisees. This is the most 
highly educated of the 4 cells but they lack experience. They perceived themselves as 
considerably independent and self employed entities.  Thus, they do not expect much 
resources from the franchisors. They are therefore the least cooperative of the 4 groups 
and are also the worst performing franchisees. They have recorded the lowest means in 
levels of brand image, local environment, and communication. They appear to be very 
frustrated that the franchisors are doing little to improve this. From a strategic point of 
view, franchisors may not wish to waste their resources in regaining their faith as it is 
hard to rebuild trust and cooperation. Further, these franchisees have very little 
motivation to remain in the relationship probably due to low levels of satisfaction. 
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Since these franchisees are highly educated, they are likely to have opportunities to 
look for other new franchisors. 
 
Best Buddy franchisees in Cell 4 have a sample size of 111 franchisees forming the 
largest group of this research. This is the group that has the best relationship with the 
franchisors and are likely to cooperate well within the confines of the contract. They are 
also the best performers in comparison to the others. They pay a lot of attention to the 
quality of the franchise system and value the inherent importance. They have recorded 
the highest mean levels for the success factors of brand image, local environment and 
communication.  They strongly believe that their franchisors are able to provide them 
with a supportive entrepreneurial environment.   Most of the franchisees in this sample 
have been part of the franchise chain for less than three years but reported the highest 
satisfaction and intention to remain. This may be attributed to their close cooperation 
with the franchisor as well as their high desire and expectations to make greater profits 
in the near future. Although to some degree, they have some motivation for autonomy, 
these franchisees are likely to be considered as the most desirable by franchisors. 
Franchisors should continue to value and nurture this group. 
 
Whinger franchisees in Cell 2 and Rough Diamond franchisees in Cell 3 show 
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mid-range scores in their means for cooperation even though the least-squares means’ 
comparison shows that these means are not statistically different from those of the other 
two cells. These franchisees consistently exercise low co-operative relations with their 
franchisors. This may be due to their low level of perceived importance for the service 
quality of the system. They do not seem to have enough capability to expand in the local 
market and are highly dependent on their franchisor. Their level of satisfaction is 
significantly different from those of Cell 1 and Cell 4. This could be due to the lack of 
support for the key success factors (i.e. brand name, local environment, and 
communication) from the franchisors. However, these franchisees still maintain higher 
intention to remain within their franchise systems.  
 
There is a major difference between Whingers (Cell 2) and Rough Diamonds (Cell 3). 
Whingers recorded higher mean scores for the success factors of brand image, local 
environment, and communication. If their franchisors were to provide more support in 
these success factors, it is highly possible for them to have better performance than 
those of Rough Diamonds (Cell 3). Whingers also have higher perception of success 
and are willing to cooperate with the franchisors. Franchisors would probably want to 
cooperate with this group of “high maintenance” franchisees if they are able to deal 
with their continuous dependence on them. However, there is also a good potential for 
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Whingers to upgrade to Best Buddy franchisees if they are provided with the right 
resources to better equip themselves to compete with the other franchisees. Rough 
Diamond franchisees have both the highest level of desire for autonomy as well as the 
lowest level of success perception.  Although it is not impossible to change the attitude 
of these franchisees, it may be difficult.  Franchisors are better off moulding Whingers 
as a form of long term investment than to potentially waste their time on Rough 




This study sets to achieve three contributions to the existing literature as described in 
the introductory section.  First, it fills the gap highlighted by literature that the 
viewpoint from franchisees (as compared to the franchisors) is just as important an 
entity in the franchise system (Jambulingam and Nevin, 1999; Grunhagen and 
Mittelstaedt, 2000). Second the FSQ Matrix is shown to be empirically evident with 
four distinct profiles of franchisees. An understanding of the characteristics of each will 
enhance the effective management of the system. Third, the two dimensions namely 
perceived gap and perceived importance have been shown to be significant in profiling 
these 4 groups of franchisees. More importantly, all parties concerned should recognize 
and respect these two dimensions in an effort to foster cooperation between franchisees 
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The findings have also provided support for various hypotheses concerning franchisees 
perceptions of the four profiles. A number of implications are evident and should be 
detailed. Under low cooperative environments, the perceptions of franchisees’ 
satisfaction and intention to remain are extremely low.  As such it is unlikely that Black 
Sheep and Rough Diamond franchisees will have a change of heart even though more 
resources are utilized to enhance the relationship. Success can only be achieved if the 
two partners are willing to co-operate willingly. On the other hand, in a highly 
cooperative relationship with franchisors, franchisees seem to be better performers and 
also have more favourable perceptions of success. The resources will be well spent in 
motivating these franchisees. This is consistent with recommendations by 
Jambulingam and Nevin (1999) that franchisors should attempt to increase 
performance by carefully selecting franchisees from a richly experiential and 
committed base. These chosen groups should then be offered resources and assistance 
that are perceived by the franchisee as key success factors (Falbe and Welsh, 1998).  
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Dant and Gundlach (1998) suggest that these franchisees who have enjoyed more 
satisfaction with the franchisor are unlikely to terminate their contracts even though 
they do not have high autonomy. This study shows otherwise. Franchisees in Cell 1 and 
4 namely the Black Sheep and Best Buddy franchisees value more autonomy than the 
two lower cells.  More research by devising valid measures have to be looked in this 
area to understand the rationale behind this finding. 
 
Whingers have the best potential to be cooperative franchisees and promoting to the 
Best Buddy Cell if given appropriate support and resources.  The only drawback is that 
they have to be properly managed.  They have the highest tendency to complain that 
they are not given the best resources. As such, negative word of mouth may affect other 
franchisees in the system and at the same time deter new entrants into the system. 
 
Limitations 
There are some limitations and new directions that can be considered. Like most 
studies, the sample size of this study can be improved. While the response rate of 20 
percent is acceptable as compared to most mail survey methodology, a larger sample 
size will certainly enhance the validity of the matrix.  Most deficient is that of Cell 4 
which is only represented by 14 franchisees. Although it can argued that in practice, 
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this number in the overall percentage actually reflects the market in practice but it may 
still limit the findings. 
 
While the measures used were adopted from established sources, other scales may be 
considered or developed for future studies. For instance, “local environment” has only 
2 items and may not exactly capture the essence of the measure in this context. The 
“communication” scale can be further explored to increase the scope of the items.  
 
Most franchising studies are done in a Western cultural context including this current 
one which is conducted in Australia.   Chiou et al. (2004) have suggested that more 
studies should be considered in an Asian context. Countries such as Taiwan (because of 
its current political status) and Mainland China (its recent inclusion in the World Trade 
Organization) should be considered. One must not also underestimate the growing 
importance and affluence of the EU market. Replications of this study will provide 
results that can be generalized and find further support for the FSQ Matrix. 
 
One other potential problem with this study is the use of an assortment of industries. 
Elango and Fried (1997) and Grunhagen and Dorsch (2003) have highlighted that 
studies covering a large base of different industries may be burdened by the fact that 
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specific factors within an industry may be undetected as they cancel each other out. 
Further, there may be intricacies within each industry that form the key success factor. 
Cross national studies of such industries will provide a better contribution for the 
stakeholders concerned. 
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Correlation Matrix of Study Variables  
 





0.910 0.287 1.000              
2. Gender
†
 0.240 0.428 0.013 1.000             
3. Age 6.265 1.627 0.310
**
 -0.099 1.000            




5.402 1.333 0.065 -0.038 0.191
**










 1.000         
7. Brand 
Image 
26.801 8.513 0.057 0.067 0.056 -0.129 -0.110 0.082 1.000        








18.807 8.315 -0.073 0.148
*






 1.000      
10. 
Activities 






 1.000     
11. 
Autonomy 
13.854 3.609 0.018 0.026 0.093 -0.065 0.067 0.216
**
 -0.064 -0.132 -0.133 -0.049 1.000    








 -0.070 1.000   
13. 
Satisfaction 














 1.000  
14. 
Cooperation 






















Cluster Solution: Description and Internal Validation 
 































    
  N=200 n = 40 n = 111 n = 35 n = 14 
  Mean 8.51 9.36 8.77 8.49 4.18 
  SD 1.49 0.66 0.75 0.90 1.73 
Perceived Gap
a
     
      
  Mean 6.92 3.14 8.34 6.00 8.80 
  SD 2.36 1.44 1.00 0.87 1.07 
Internal Validation F(df) p-Value Power (1-β) Effect Size (η
2
) 
      
Multivariate Results 171.76 0.000 0.96 0.72 
Univariate Results     
Perceived importance
b
 133.56(df =3, 196) 0.000 0.98 0.90 
Perceived Gap
b
 246.60(df =3, 196) 0.000 0.94 0.89 
 
a
As previously mentioned in operationalization, larger values of perceived importance show 
greater agreement, and smaller values of perceived gap represent higher discrepancy between 
franchisees and franchisors. 
b
Post-ANOVA Duncan’s paired comparisons (with experiment-wise Type I error held at α = 
0.05) indicate that all possible pairs are significantly different from each other for perceived 
importance and perceived gaps. 
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Table 3 
Results of FSQ Permutations with MANOVA 
 




































( α = 0.05) 
 n = 40 n = 111 n = 35 n =14   









p = 0.007 
Cell 4 > 1, 2, and 3 












p = 0.000 
Cell 4 > 1, 2, and 3 
Cell 2 > 1 









p = 0.000 
Cell 4 > 1, 2, and 3 
Cell 2 > 1 









p = 0.000 
Cell 4 > 1, 2, and 3 
Cell 2 > 1 and 3 









p = 0.000 
Cell 4 > 1, 2, and 3 
Cell 2 > 1 









p = 0.000 
Cell 4 > 1, 2, and 3 
Cell 2 > 1 









p = 0.002 
Cell 4 > 2 and 3 
Cell 1 > 3; Cell 2 > 3 









p = 0.201 
Cell 3 > 4 









p = 0.3835 
None 









p = 0.423 
None 









p = 0.013 
Cell 1 > 3 and 4 
Cell 2 > 3 and 4 
Multivariate results: Wilks' Lambda F = 6.65, p-value = 0.000 (AUS). For the scaled questions above, larger values 
show greater agreement. 
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Figure 1 
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• High maintenance for 
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Appendix I 









Perceived importance of FSQ
 §
  
α = 0.91 (AUS)  
Perceived Gap of FSQ 
α = 0.94  
9  1. Franchisor provides management know-how 
2. Franchisor adapts to the market 
3. Franchisor has ability to develop new products 
4. Franchisor provides training and support 
5. Franchisee applies high quality standards from franchisor 
6. Franchisor establishes operational system efficiency  
7. Prices of materials from franchisor are competitive 
8. Franchisor shields franchisee’s rights and interest 
9. Franchisor is willing to solve problems 
Brand image 
α = 0.78  
5 
#
 1. Franchisor has positive public name recognition 
2. Franchisor provides facility design 
3. Franchisee follows consistent product and service standards 
4. Franchisor provides extensive national advertising 
5. Franchisor participates in promotions with franchisee 
Local environment 
α = 0.86  
2  1. Franchisor helps franchisee to find good local market location 
2. Franchisor shows flexible adaptation to local market 
Communication 
  α = 0.90  
3  1. Franchisor’s interaction with franchisee is excellent 
2. Franchisee is encouraged to share with franchisor 
3. Franchisee is encouraged to share with other franchisees 
Franchisee activities 
  α = 0.77  
5  1. Franchisee shows leadership 
2. Franchisee handles stressful situations 
3. Full-time franchisee commitment 
4. Franchisee is healthy 
5. Franchisee involves community 
Autonomy 
  α = 0.70  
3  1. The franchisee prefers to work independently of others 
2. The franchisee prefers to consult franchisors in planning 
operations (R) 
3. The franchisee prefers the opportunity for independent thought 
and action 
Satisfaction 
  α = 0.74 
3 
#
 1. The franchisee is very cooperative with the franchisor 
2. Overall, the franchisor makes the franchisee earn so much 
money 
3. The franchisor’s physical distribution support system is better 
than that of the competitors’ 
Intention to remain 
  α = 0.90  
2  1. The franchisee made the right decision by investing in this 
franchise. 
2. If he had it to do over again, the franchisee would still purchase 
this franchise. 
(R) denotes reverse-coded scales. 
§
:  Both the questionnaire items of perceived importance and perceived gap of FSQ are the same.  
 
